I. INTRODUCTION

- BUTTON STORY
- VAST HUMAN & TECHNICAL COLLECTION CAPACITY WITH THE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES OF A GREAT UNIVERSITY.
- HOW TO HARNESS & FOCUS THIS VITAL ENGINE OF DEMOCRACY.
- IF I WERE A POLICY MAKER ...

- II. IN ORDER TO HAVE AN IMPACT, INTELLIGENCE MUST BE <u>USEFUL</u>, <u>TIMELY</u>, & <u>OBJECTIVE</u>.
 - A. USEFUL -- GOVERNMENT DEPENDS ON INTELLIGENCE TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT OUR FOREIGN POLICY, VERIFY ARMS AGREEMENTS, & UNDERSTAND MILITARY CAPABILITIES & INTENTIONS OF ADVERSARIES.
 - B. TIMELY -- TRIP TO NORAD IN JULY POINTED

 TO THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY, ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE.

C. OBJECTIVE

- 1) MUST GIVE BEST ESTIMATES, NOT "COOK THE BOOKS."
- 2) I HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRESERVES ITS OBJECTIVITY.
- MY ROLE
 - NIO PROCESS
- 3. WE INTEND TO "TELL IT AS IT IS" -- EXAMPLE: THE JUNE 1987 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN & SUPERPOWERS IN THE GULF. CIA VIEW WAS NOT ONE THAT POLICYMAKERS WELCOMES, BUT WE DID NOT CHANGE IT.
- 4) AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I THINK THIS INSISTENCE ON OBJECTIVITY MAY BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THAT I COULD MAKE IN GALVANIZING A COHESIVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INTEGRITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ANALYSTS OR PROGRAM MANAGERS.

- III. THE NEED FOR SURVEY
 - SOURCES & METHODS
 - CORRESPONDING NEED TO BE ACCOUNTABLE & BUILD FRESH.
- IV. COVERT ACTION THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.
 - A. TYPES OF COVERT ACTION -- POLITICAL WORK THROUGH
 COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, PROVIDING SUPPLIES, GIVING ADVICE.
 - B. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTION IS NOT DEFINED BY LAW, IT HAS COME TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT APPARENT.
 - C. FROM PRESIDENT FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT FORWARD, EVERY PRESIDENT HAS ENDORSED AND USED COVERT ACTION.

D.	COVERT AC	TIVITIES	CLAIM	ONLY A	4 VER	Y SMA	LL P	ORTION	1 OF
	THE CIA'S	RESOURCE	S			, BUT	THE	Y ARE	THE
	FOCUS OF	GREATEST	CONGR	RESSION	VAL &	PUBL	IC A	TTENT	ON.

STAT

- V. IRAN-CONTRA SECRECY WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY.
 - A. COVERT ACTION WAS MOVED OUTSIDE OF THE CIA INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
 - B. SITUATION HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT RULES INSIDE A GOVERNMENT THAT DID NOT KNOW.
 - C. THERE ARE RULES GOVERNING COVERT ACTION THAT IF SCRUPULOUSLY FOLLOWED WILL MEET CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SUSTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY.

- VI. I BROUGHT WITH ME TO THE JOB OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TWO CARDINAL THESES:
 - A. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MUST BE CONDUCTED LAWFULLY AND WITH ABSOLUTE FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND TO OUR LAWS.
 - B. THERE MUST BE A TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.


- VII. BEFORE UNDERTAKING ANY COVERT ACTIVITIES, WE IN INTELLIGENCE HAVE TO DETERMINE IF IT CAN BE DONE IN A LAWFUL WAY.
 - A. OUR OWN INTERNAL COVERT ACTION REVIEW GROUP ASKS ITSELF:
 - 1. IS IT CONSISTENT WITH OPEN UNITED STATES POLICY?
 - 2. IS IT CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN VALUES?
 - 3. WILL IT WORK?
 - B. THIS KIND OF SCRUTINY ENSURES EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE USE OF COVERT CAPABILITY.
 - C. NSC.

VIII. ADEQUACY OF CURRENT LAWS.

- A. IN 1976 & 1977, BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES TO MONITOR ALL SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
- B. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO KEEP THE COMMITTEES FULLY & CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
- C. WHEN NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT CAN LIMIT NOTIFICATION TO THE "GANG OF EIGHT."
- D. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES MUST BE FULLY INFORMED IN A "TIMELY FASHION" OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR WHICH PRIOR NOTICE WAS NOT GIVEN.
- E. PRESIDENT'S NSDD.

IX. OUR DUTY TO CONGRESS

- A. IN COVERT ACTIVITY, THERE IS OFTEN DECEPTION TO CONCEAL THE SOURCE OF THE ACTIVITY.
- B. IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS, THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR DECEPTION.
 - 1. MEET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MONTHLY.
- 2) IF I AM ASKED ABOUT SOMETHING THAT I FEEL I CANNOT ANSWER, I WILL NOT PRETEND THAT I DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER.
- C. WE MUST NOT HAVE DECEPTION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS OR THE PUBLIC; BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THERE IS NO NEED FOR SECRECY.



XI. CONCLUDE WITH QUOTE BY SIR WILLIAM STEPHENSON.

"PERHAPS A DAY WILL DAWN WHEN TYRANTS CAN NO LONGER
THREATEN THE LIBERTY OF ANY PEOPLE. WHEN THE FUNCTION OF ALL NATIONS,
HOWEVER VARIED THEIR IDEOLOGIES, WILL BE TO ENHANCE LIFE NOT TO
CONTROL IT. IF SUCH A CONDITION IS POSSIBLE, IT IS IN A FUTURE
TOO FAR DISTANT TO FORESEE. UNTIL THAT SAFER, BETTER DAY, THE
DEMOCRACIES WILL AVOID DISASTER AND POSSIBLE TOTAL DESTRUCTION
ONLY BY MAINTAINING THEIR DEFENSES. AMONG THE INCREASINGLY
INTRICATE ARSENALS ACROSS THE WORLD, INTELLIGENCE IS AN
ESSENTIAL WEAPON. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT. BUT IT IS, BEING
SECRET, THE MOST DANGEROUS. SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT ITS ABUSE
MUST BE DEVISED, REVISED, AND RIGIDLY APPLIED. BUT AS IN ALL
ENTERPRISE, THE CHARACTER AND WISDOM OF THOSE TO WHOM IT IS
ENTRUSTED WILL BE DECISIVE. IN THE INTEGRITY OF THAT GUARDIANSHP
LIES THE HOPE OF FREE PEOPLE TO ENDURE AND PREVAIL."

--A NATION DEDICATED TO THE RULE OF LAW CAN PROTECT ITSELF AND ITS HERITAGE IN NO OTHER WAY.